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1 Introduction
Since the start of the millennium, the broadband market has been characterized by a high degree
of innovation, which has led to a rapid increase in broadband adoption, and the introduction of
new innovative services. While “traditional” broadband over copper or cable TV lines continues its
expansion in many countries, telecommunications operators have begun to deploy so-called “next
generation access networks” (NGANs), that is, …bre-optic access networks, to provide high-speed
broadband services to consumers. Though the deployment of next generation access networks is
still at an early stage, as recently documented in the study “Digital Agenda for Europe” (2011),
many incumbent and alternative operators have planned to invest in the near future in these new
broadband infrastructures.
Investment in …bre infrastructure is extremely relevant not only for the communications sector
per se, but also for the overall economy given its signi…cant potential contribution to economic
growth. Many recent papers quantify the macroeconomic e¤ects of such investments. Röller and
Waverman (2001), using data from 21 OECD countries over a 20-year period, show that an increase
of 10% in the broadband adoption rate leads on average to an increase of 2.8% in GDP growth.
More recently, Koutroumpis (2009) shows that the average impact of broadband infrastructure on
GDP is 0.63% (for the EU-15, in the period 2002-2007), that is, 17% of total growth in this period.
He also shows that there are increasing returns from broadband investments, once a critical mass
is reached.1 Greenstein and McDevitt (2009) show that broadband accounted for $28 billion of US
GDP in 2006, and they estimate that $20 to $22 billion of GDP were associated with household use
1He evaluates the critical mass at 30% of broadband penetration.
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of broadband. Finally, Czernich et al. (2011) …nd that, after a country has introduced broadband,
GDP per capita is 2.7 to 3.9 percent higher on average than before its introduction. In terms
of subsequent di¤usion, a 10 percentage point increase in broadband penetration raises annual
per-capita GDP growth by 0.9 to 1.5 percentage points.
High-bandwidth infrastructure however calls for large capital expenditures, attracting regula-
tory concerns about third party access to these networks. Following the EU Recommendation
C(2010) 6223 on regulated access to NGANs (September 2010, “NGA Recommendation”), in Eu-
rope, national regulatory authorities have been adopting a new set of regulatory rules on network
access which is intended, on the one hand, to avoid re-monopolization of the market for high-speed
broadband services by calling for some kind of regulated access to NGAN infrastructure, and, on the
other hand, to provide enough incentives to invest in high speed infrastructures to both incumbent
and entrant operators.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this important debate by focusing on three hotly
debated issues: …rst, the problem of migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA in-
frastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might a¤ect this process; second, the introduc-
tion of di¤erentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical di¤erences that might emerge
in the deployment of NGANs in a country; third, and …nally, the impact of co-investment decisions
on market outcomes and their interplay with access regulation. The approach is to present the
main economic and regulatory problems that are emerging in the policy arena and, using recent
economic literature, to provide some discussion and proposals for guidelines that might be useful
to regulators and policy makers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the economic and regulatory aspects
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of migration from the legacy to the NGA networks are analyzed. In Section 3 the geographical
dimension of regulatory intervention is considered, while Section 4 studies co-investment. Section
5 concludes with some policy considerations.
2 The Migration to NGAN: the Interplay between Investment
Incentives and Access Pricing
The new investments in NGAN will not immediately replace the copper or cable legacy networks,
suggesting that the transition from old infrastructures to new infrastructures will go slowly. Re-
placement will be gradual for several reasons, such as: (i) the regulatory constraints on copper
networks, which rule out an immediate switch-o¤ of the old network; (ii) the uncertainties about
demand and investment costs, which call for a progressive investment strategy; and (iii) the …nan-
cial market constraints that imply that roll-out must be phased.
This implies that, during a transition phase, two di¤erent infrastructures will operate, and
presumably each type of network will be regulated with a di¤erent set of rules. The incentives to
invest in NGAN infrastructures will therefore be in‡uenced not only by the terms of access set for
…bre infrastructures, but also by the terms of access set for the legacy copper networks. Hence, a new
regulatory problem arises: the interplay between the (potentially di¤erent) access regulations on
the existing old network and on the new networks, in the context of new infrastructure investments.
The NGA Recommendation underlines how regulatory policies during the migration phase
can be fundamental in determining the incentives to invest in new infrastructures. It states that
“existing obligations [..] should continue and should not be undone by changes to the existing
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network architecture and technology, unless agreement is reached on an appropriate migration
path between the SMP operator and operators currently enjoying access to the SMP operator’s
network” (Article 39).
Regulators play a distinctive role in this process. Article 40 states that “NRAs should put in
place a transparent framework for the migration from copper to …bre-based networks. NRAs should
ensure that the systems and procedures put in place by the SMP operator [...] are designed so as
to facilitate the switching of alternative providers to NGA-based access products” (our emphasis).
In this respect, the Recommendation not only stresses that existing regulatory tools on the legacy
network should be maintained in the medium term, but also that a new set of rules should be intro-
duced to facilitate the migration from old to new infrastructures. However, the Recommendation
is completely silent about the potential interplay between the access remedies on both old and new
networks. It also seems to neglect the potential impact of access regulation on the legacy network
on the incentives to invest in new infrastructures, for both alternative and incumbent operators.
The migration issue has recently received considerable attention also by market specialists.
In a recent report for the European Competitive Telecommunication Association (ECTA), WIK
(2011) explores a network competition model calibrated with engineering cost model data.2 Among
the many results of the simulations run, one take-away is that lower access charges to legacy
networks encourage incumbents to invest in NGNs, and thus allow a rapid switch-o¤ of the copper
network in places where …bre is already installed. In contrast, a high access charge for the copper
network reduces incentives for …bre investments, because moving access seekers’ customers to …bre
cannibalizes the incumbent’s existing access pro…ts.
2Ste¤en Hoernig participated in the WIK study.
5
On the other hand, the report by Plum (2011) for the European (incumbent) Telecommuni-
cations Network Operators (ETNO) claims that a low access price for copper discourages NGA
infrastructure investment. This is because it leads to low prices for standard broadband, which
encourages retail customers to stay on copper, thereby negatively impacting the business case for
…bre. Both the WIK and the Plum documents stress that the access charge for the legacy network
has a major in‡uence on the transition to NGANs, however, its impact is disputed.
A vibrant academic literature has developed around the relationship between access pricing
and investment incentives.3 More related to the migration issue, Brito et al. (2010) analyze the
incentives of a vertically integrated …rm (regulated at the wholesale level) to invest in and to give
access to an upgraded wholesale technology. Brito et al. assume that the new technology is not
subject to regulation, and analyze the regulator’s decision depending on whether the innovation is
drastic or non-drastic. In the presence of a non-drastic innovation (such as Ethernet connectivity,
4G mobile networks and NGAN, at least in the short run), monopolization of the industry is not a
concern, and hence, the regulator can increase the entrants’ competitiveness by setting a low access
charge on the copper network and let them compete …ercely with the incumbent. On the other hand,
if innovation is drastic in nature (NGAN and 4G connections in the long run), the incumbent can
monopolize the market, and therefore the regulator should introduce speci…c incentives for entrant
operators to invest in alternative infrastructures.
The …rst academic analysis of migration is provided by Bourreau, Cambini and Do¼gan (2011).
The authors consider a model where access to the legacy copper network (in the form of local
3See, for example, Gans (2001 and 2007), Foros (2004), Avenali et al. (2010), Vareda and Hoernig (2010),
Manenti and Scialà (2011). For recent comprehensive surveys of theoretical and empirical contributions in this area,
see Cambini and Jiang (2009) and Bourreau, Do¼gan and Manant (2010).
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loop unbundling) is available everywhere in a country, and an incumbent and an entrant operator
compete for the provision of retail broadband services to consumers.
In their setting, the country is composed of a continuum of areas, for which the …xed cost of a
new network varies. Firms sequentially decide on their investments in NGNs, with the incumbent
…rm as the …rst mover, due to its control over the legacy network and over other essential facilities
such as ducts. However, the incumbent’s investment generates positive spillovers: the entrant’s
…xed cost of investing in a new network is assumed to be lower in the areas where the incumbent
has already rolled out its NGN than in those areas where an NGN is absent.4 Access to the legacy
network is regulated, while in a …rst step the NGAN is totally unregulated. The authors also
present the case in which both operators are obliged to grant access to their rival in areas with a
monopoly …bre infrastructure, and analyze the relation between the access charges on the old and
the new infrastructures.
In the competition stage, three con‡icting e¤ects emerge in this setting: (i) when the access
charge for the existing infrastructure is set at a high level, the entrant’s opportunity cost of invest-
ment is low, which promotes infrastructure investment by the alternative operator (this corresponds
to the so-called replacement e¤ect5); (ii) in the presence of a positive investment spillovers, a higher
access charge increases the incumbent’s opportunity cost of investment due to the wholesale revenue
e¤ect : if the incumbent invests in a higher quality network, the entrant will invest in reaction, and
4For example, when the incumbent builds an NGN in a given area, it may have to obtain administrative authoriza-
tions, gather information on existing ducts or rights of passage, etc., which generates administrative and contractual
costs. When the entrant decides to roll out its own NGN network in the same area, its investment costs are lower if
it bene…ts from these incumbent’s earlier e¤orts. Other potential reasons could be informational spillovers, as well
as direct cost savings due to infrastructure sharing.
5This e¤ect implies that, everything else held constant, a monopoly …rm has lower incentives to invest in an
innovation than a competitive …rm, as the former “replaces” itself. See Bourreau et al. (2010) for a general description
of this e¤ect in the telecoms industry.
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the incumbent will then lose some wholesale pro…ts – this e¤ect is present in WIK (2011); and
…nally (iii) when the access charge on the legacy network is low, the prices for the services which
rely on this network are low, hence, in order to encourage customers to switch away from the legacy
network, operators would need to make low-priced …bre o¤ers, which is line with Plum (2011)’s
main argument. This latter e¤ect, which we refer to as the business migration e¤ect, reduces the
pro…tability of the new infrastructure, and hence, the incentives to invest in it.
The coexistence of these multiple e¤ects creates a non-monotonic relation between the access
price for copper and the investments in the new access technology (i.e., the coverage of the NGNs).
>From a social point of view, there can be con‡icts between di¤erent potential objectives: (i)
a higher access charge on the legacy network stimulates investment by entrants and sometimes
(but not always) by incumbents, enhancing dynamic e¢ciency; (ii) however, a higher access charge
negatively a¤ects static e¢ciency due to higher retail prices in uncovered areas, and duplication
of …xed costs. Using simulations, the authors show that the socially optimal access charge to
the legacy network depends on the degree of investment spillovers: If the degree of spillovers is
relatively small, the regulator should set the legacy access price at marginal cost; conversely, when
spillovers are strong, the access charge should increase proportionally with spillovers. Intuitively, if
the entrant can obtain a considerable reduction in its investment cost due to the spillover from the
incumbent’s investment, then the regulator should raise the access charge to the legacy network
in order to favor investment. The idea is that, when there are strong spillovers, the incumbent’s
investment stimulates the entrant’s investment. To avoid losing wholesale revenues, the incumbent
has incentives to reduce its NGN investment. In this case, the entrant does not invest much either,
as it faces high investment costs. This is why the regulator should increase the access price on the
8
legacy network in order to provide both …rms with stronger investment incentives to invest and
counter balance the spillover e¤ect.
When access to both the old and the new infrastructures is regulated, the authors highlight the
presence of an interplay between the two access regimes. A new feature of regulatory intervention
therefore emerges: the access rules to legacy as well as the NGN infrastructures cannot be considered
separately, on the contrary the ex ante rules on one infrastructure a¤ects the ex ante rules on the
other. More speci…cally, given that the incumbent typically manages the existing legacy network,
the interplay between access pricing regimes on the existing and new infrastructures depends on
which company is the “leader” in the deployment of the NGN.
The idea is that the access charge on the legacy network a¤ects the trade-o¤ for the regulator
between setting a high access charge on the NGN, which would extend marginally the area with a
monopolistic NGN, and setting a low access charge, which would limit the deadweight loss in the
areas with the monopolistic infrastructure.
When the incumbent is the “leader” in the deployment of an NGA network, raising the access
price on the legacy network has three e¤ects, which all gives the incentive to the regulator to
increase the access charge on the NGN. First, a higher access charge on the legacy network reduces
the size of the area with a monopoly NGN infrastructure, as it intensi…es the wholesale revenue
e¤ect, hence reducing the incumbent’s investment incentives. This, in turn, reduces the deadweight
associated to a high access charge on the NGN. Second, a higher access price on the legacy network
reduces welfare in the areas not covered by an NGN. Hence, the regulator has an incentive to expand
marginally the area covered by an NGN and to reduce the uncovered areas where retail prices tend
to increase. Third, the frontier between the uncovered areas and the areas with a monopolistic
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NGN becomes more sensitive to the access price on the NGN; this also gives an incentive to the
regulator to increase the access charge on the NGN. All in all, when the incumbent is the “leader”
in the deployment of NGN, the socially optimal access charge to the monopoly NGN comes out to
be positively related to the access charge on the legacy network.
On the contrary, if the entrant invests more than the incumbent in NGN (i.e., the entrant
is the “leader”), a higher access charge to the legacy network increases the entrant’s investment
incentives because the replacement e¤ect is reduced. Since the size of the areas with a monopoly
NGN increases, the regulator has an incentive to lower the access charge on the NGN to reduce
the deadweight loss in these areas. At the same time, the marginal gain of rolling out an NGN in
uncovered areas can either increase or decrease, which gives the incentive to the regulator to either
increase or decrease the access price on the NGN. Finally, the frontier between the uncovered areas
and the areas with a monopoly NGN becomes less sensitive to the access price on the NGN, which
gives an incentive to the regulator to decrease the access charge on the NGN. At the end of the
day, it turns out that when the access price on the legacy network increases, the regulator should
either lower or increase the NGN access charge. Hence, the relation between the socially optimal
access charge on the monopoly NGN and the access charge on the legacy network can be reversed,
when the entrant is the “leader”.
3 The Geographical Dimension of Regulatory Intervention
A complicating feature for next generation network deployment and associated regulatory interven-
tions is that competition among high-speed networks is likely to emerge only in speci…c geographical
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areas, such as very dense metropolitan areas, while in the rest of the country infrastructure com-
petition will not arise. From a regulatory point of view, this implies that rules should di¤er across
areas.
As stated in the NGA Recommendation, “the transition from copper-based to …bre-based net-
works may change the conditions of competition in di¤erent geographic areas and may necessitate a
review of the geographical scope of markets [...] and remedies in cases where such markets or reme-
dies have been segmented on the basis of competition from local loop unbundling (LLU)” (recital
10). The NGA Recommendation thus invites NRAs to examine di¤erences in the degree of compe-
tition in di¤erent geographical areas in order to determine whether the de…nition of sub-national
geographic markets or the imposition of di¤erentiated remedies are warranted.
While this is plausible from the competition law point of view now popular in telecoms regula-
tion,6 there is a lack of theoretical investigations about the type and the linkage –if any– of di¤erent
remedies and their impact on …rms’ investment decisions.
Lestage and Flacher (2010) is one of the …rst papers that address the issue of geographical
coverage and access pricing. In their model, the incumbent operator and an entrant decide simul-
taneously where to roll-out a new infrastructure. In order to take into account the di¤erences in
geographical coverage, the authors assume that the investment cost in NGA networks increases as
the density of population decreases. Their main result is that access regulation reduces the regions
where facility-based competition is likely to emerge to the areas with the highest population density.
As shown by Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) and Cambini and Silvestri (2011), risk sharing –
6Xavier and Ypsilanti (2011) analyze the implementation of geographical regulation in a few countries (including
the UK, Australia, Austria, and Portugal), and highlight the complexity in practice of geographically segmented
regulations.
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that is, the possibility for the incumbent and the entrants to jointly undertake and share the
costs of the investment– might be an alternative instrument to access price regulation, enhancing
dynamic e¢ciency (by expanding …bre networks’ coverage), consumer surplus and social welfare.
Risk sharing, in fact, leads to better outcomes in terms of social e¢ciency than alternative modes of
regulation, such as partial regulation (when ex-ante intervention applies only to the legacy network,
while the NGN is left unregulated) or full regulation (where also access to NGN is regulated),
especially when the entrants have a better ability to provide new broadband services.
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2011a) explicitly consider the presence of geographically dif-
ferentiated NGN access regulation and analyze the impact of such rules on investments in new
access networks. The authors develop a model with a continuum of areas. Two operators decide
to deploy their own networks as long as the investment costs are recovered by equilibrium pro…ts.
In equilibrium, there is infrastructure competition only in a fraction of the country, while in the
rest, infrastructure monopolies emerge. While all new networks are subject to third party access
obligations, the access rules may di¤er between competitive (i.e., duopoly) and monopolistic in-
frastructure areas. They then revisit di¤erent regulatory regimes and analyze how each regime
a¤ects the incentives to invest in the di¤erent sub-markets. More speci…cally, they evaluate the im-
pact on investment incentives of di¤erent regulatory access rules such as: cost-based access pricing,
where the access charges are set at the (long run) marginal cost in each area; uniform access pric-
ing, where the regulator sets a uniform access charge in all areas; and …nally, a “light regulation”
regime where access charges are set on a commercial basis, except that the regulator imposes that
the NGN access price should not be too high so as to foreclose the potential entrants.
The authors show that higher NGN access charges lead to larger NGN coverage, both in the
12
monopoly and in the duopoly areas. This result implies that the regulator will face a dilemma
between setting a lower access charge to maximize per-area welfare, hence maintaining lower retail
prices, and setting a high access charge to maximize coverage. This trade-o¤ is analyzed under
di¤erent regulatory scenarios. In presence of a cost-based regulation, total coverage turns out to
be lower than in the benchmark case where access is unregulated. Hence, the standard cost based
regulation –that has been traditionally applied to regulate access to the legacy copper network–
might deprive investment incentives in new high-speed infrastructures.
Interestingly, however, the analysis points out the presence of an interplay between the social
optimal NGN access charges in the two areas, i.e., the duopoly and the monopolistic NGN zones:
it emerges that the two di¤erent access charges should be positively correlated one with each other.
In other words, if the regulator sets a very low access charge in the monopoly zone, it should also
set a low access charge in the duopoly zone. Intuitively, if the access charge in the monopolistic
area is low, per-area welfare is high in the monopoly area, and therefore the social net bene…t of
extending the duopoly area (over having a monopoly infrastructure in the area) is low. Therefore,
the regulator should set a low access fee in the duopoly area too, and this has two positive e¤ects:
…rst, it increases per-area welfare in the duopoly area due to intensi…ed competition, and second, it
reduces the duopoly area. In this case, reducing the duopoly area is socially bene…cial because the
net social bene…t of having a duopoly infrastructure instead of a monopoly infrastructure is lower,
due in particular to the duplication of …xed costs.
In presence of a uniform access pricing rule, that is, when the access fee should be the same in
both the duopoly and monopoly areas, the authors show that the social bene…t of expanding the
duopolistic NGN area depends on the degree of service di¤erentiation among broadband operators.
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If the di¤erentiation is limited, with a uniform access charge the social gross bene…t of expanding
the duopoly area is lower than the duplication cost. In other words, from a social point of view, the
duopoly area is too large. On the contrary, if the degree of di¤erentiation is su¢ciently high, and
the access charge is also su¢ciently high, then the social gross bene…t of expanding the duopoly
area is larger than the duplication cost. In this case, it is socially optimal to expand the duopoly
infrastructure area and to socially sustain competition among facility-based NGN operators.
Finally, in presence of a light intervention for the NGN access regime, the results show that
imposing as a remedy that the NGN access price should not be too high so as to foreclose the
potential entrants, generates a positive e¤ect on total coverage, that increases relatively to the
case in which access to NGNs is left totally unregulated; the coverage of the duopoly area is also
expanded.
In sum, it emerges that traditional cost-based access methods are no longer the best regulatory
tools when new infrastructure investments should be realized, and that the degree of product
di¤erentiation should matter in the regulatory decision of raising access fees to the NGN.
4 Co-investment and Access Remedies
Since the principal barrier to entry in network markets is the cost of constructing the physical
network, a logical manner to increase NGAN coverage seems to be to invite operators to invest
jointly rather than individually. This approach is gaining support, and has already been adopted in
metropolitan France. The main NGA-speci…c twist introduced there is that co-investing operators
lay multiple …bre lines instead of just one, so that operators can engage in full facility-based
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competition while sharing in the cost of digging as well as other lump-sum costs.
Letting network operators coordinate at the investment level naturally raises concerns that
they might then attempt to collude at retail level, leading to higher retail prices and a reduction
in consumer surplus. Thus access obligations are likely to be imposed, which can be taken up by
existing operators or by entrants who will not invest in an own network.
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2011b) analyze the e¤ect of cooperative investment on NGN
coverage and its interplay with access obligations in a model where two operators invest in coverage
and an entrant may ask for access. They address several research questions concerning coverage,
the e¤ects of collusion, and access obligations.
One question that Bourreau et al. address is whether the introduction of co-investment could be
a feasible way of increasing overall coverage in the absence of access provisions, assuming that …rms
were to compete in retail markets. The answer is largely negative, unless speci…c circumstances
apply. The reason is that the most costly regions covered in equilibrium are those where retail
returns just cover the investment cost. Under competition the sum of retail returns of the (compet-
ing) co-investors are most likely below the monopoly pro…ts. Thus, the most expensive areas will
remain monopolies, which implies that their coverage is the same with and without co-investment.
The latter conclusion does not hold, though, if the sum of retail pro…ts is larger than the
monopoly pro…ts. This would happen if the introduction of competition (and thus of more vari-
ety) leads to a strong demand expansion e¤ect, for example because consumers’ tastes are very
heterogenous. In the latter case, and only in this case, the total coverage increases because of
co-investment.
A di¤erent path to increasing coverage through co-investment would be through collusion in
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retail price setting, i.e., the joint setting of higher retail prices by co-investing networks. While this
would evidently not be desirable from the point of view of consumers already covered by a network,
again the expectation of higher retail returns would encourage networks to cover more remote
areas.7 The thought of collusion of course collides head-on with the original idea for promoting
co-investment, which is to increase retail competition.
The usual measure to avoid collusion and increase competition in a retail market is to facilitate
entry, especially through access provisions. Obligations to give access to new NGA infrastructure
have indeed been imposed in Europe, and their e¤ects on the incentives for network coverage have
been widely discussed. Bourreau et al. con…rm this result also in the presence of co-investment.
On the other hand, they consider the e¤ect of access on the co-investment decisions themselves.
They …nd that the outcome is quite complex and that co-investment is non-monotonic in the access
price. Essentially, results are driven by the relative magnitude of returns from co-investing in one
additional area or asking for access there, where the latter depends on the level of the access price
and on entry.
For a very low access price, entry of access seekers will occur in all covered areas, including the
most competitive ones where networks have co-invested. For a medium-range access price, entrants
only enter where the other network also asks for access, but do not enter co-investment areas. This
strategy increases networks’ incentives for co-investment and thus the areas where the latter takes
place. For high access charges entrants stay out and only installed operators ask for access to each
others’ covered areas. In this case, incentives for co-investments are diminished as compared to
7See Inderst and Peitz (2011) for related arguments in a setting where access is not regulated but access provider
and seeker freely conclude “e¢cient” contracts. The latter invariably involve restrictions to competition in order to
increase retail returns.
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the previous case, since retail revenues in access areas have increased. Finally, for extremely high
access charges no access requests are made and the market outcome is identical to the one without
access.
Thus, in the last case the co-investment area is largest, since under access networks trade o¤
the returns from co-investment with those from retail competition under access. Without access
the latter would be zero, and therefore, any kind of access provisions reduces the incentives for
co-investment. Interestingly, though, the size of the co-investment area is not monotonous in the
level of the access price. In other words, it would be wrong to believe that, if the introduction of
access obligations were to be taken for granted, more co-investment could only be achieved through
increasing the access price. Rather, one needs to take into account the networks’ incentives to
ask for access themselves instead of investing, and how the latter interact with the entrants access
decisions. It turns out that intermediate values of access prices lead to the largest amount of
co-investment if access obligations are to be imposed.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
>From the above it has become clear that once one takes further steps beyond the much-researched
question of whether access obligations harm investments into next-generation access infrastructures,
a host of additional complexities arise and the picture quickly becomes blurry. In the transition
from existing to new infrastructure, it is not only access to …bre that shapes incentives, but equally
it is the access regime for existing copper networks that in‡uences strongly how much interest both
network owners and access seekers have in making this transition. While there is unanimity that
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the e¤ect of copper access is strong and that access to both platforms need to be coordinated in the
transition phase, there are starkly contrasting results about how this coordination is to be done.
The analysis shows that the access charge on the legacy network has an ambiguous e¤ect on
investment on NGNs, which can be either positive or negative. When an access obligation on
monopoly NGN infrastructure is introduced, the regulator should also set the NGN access price in
relation to the access charge on the legacy network.
If the regulator imposes di¤erentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical di¤erences
in NGAN deployment, it emerges that traditional cost-based access methods might be no longer
the best regulatory tool to sustain NGN coverage, but also that regulatory decisions should be
conditioned on the degree of product di¤erentiation among operators in order to avoid an excessive
duplication of …xed costs. On the contrary, a form of “light” intervention that imposes as a remedy
that the NGN access price should not be too high so as to foreclose the potential entrants, generates
a positive e¤ect on total coverage, that increases relatively to the case in which access to NGNs is
left totally unregulated.
Co-investment may not be an e¤ective means to increase overall coverage, but rather to make
covered areas more competitive. Its relationship with access pricing to NGAN is rather complex,
since asking for access may be a viable alternative to entering a co-investment agreement. Therefore
access prices have a non-monotonic relationship with the amount of co-investment and increasing
the access price may lead to less co-investment.
To sum up, the deployment of NGANs calls for the implementation of new regulatory regimes,
as the old regimes cannot be applied per se. These new regimes should account in particular for the
competition between the “old” copper technology and the “new” …ber technology, the geographical
18
dimension of investments, and the need for cooperative investments. This is a complex task, and
we think that further research on these topics would be helpful to understand better the relation
between regulation and investment in NGNs.
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